Market Networks and the Value in Knowledge Exchanges: Evidence from Biotechnology Strategic Alliances by Anastasios Karamanos
 
 
MARKET NETWORKS AND THE VALUE IN 
KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGES: 




ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge 








ESRC Centre for Business Research 
University of Cambridge 
The Judge Institute of Management Building 
Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1223 765329 
















This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Industrial 
Organisation, Competitive Strategy, and Business Performance. 
  
Abstract 
Researchers have argued that market networks are an integral part of the firm’s 
value output, but the extent to which the structural characteristics of firms and 
their partners in market networks mediate the link between network 
embeddedness and value generation remains a largely unexplored area of 
research. This paper investigates whether diffusion mechanisms within market 
networks enable the latter to selectively impute the value of inter-organisational 
knowledge exchanges. It empirically determines the extent of this phenomenon 
in the context of the strategic alliance market network in the biotechnology 
industry. I find evidence that the structural positions of biotechnology firms and 
their partners in the network of strategic alliances are significant predictors of 
wealth gains from the announcement of knowledge exchange deals. The market 
reacts more to announcements of tacit knowledge exchange deals by firms on 
the periphery of the strategic alliance market network. Moreover, the more 
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1. Introduction 
 
Network theory research studies the effects of the structure of inter-
organisational networks and the position of firms within them on economic 
behaviour (Granovetter 1985), strategic actions (Gulati 1999a; 199b; Gulati et 
al 2000) and competitive behaviour (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). Firms’ 
ties with organisations that have direct relevance to their core economic 
interests and value creation (e.g. strategic alliances) form market networks. A 
strategic alliance market network at any given point in time is the set of 
connections established by past alliances in the industry, where firms are the 
nodes in the network and prior alliances represent the ties linking these nodes. 
 
Research on the effects of the embeddedness of firms in market networks has 
focused extensively on firm performance differentials. For instance, Baum and 
Oliver (1991) and Mitchell and Singh (1996) showed that alliances raised 
organisational survival rates. Powell et al (1996) found that companies that had 
formed many alliances experienced accelerated growth rates. Although the 
evidence rests heavily on the side that alliances engender superior performance, 
the extent to which the structural characteristics of the focal firm and its 
partners in market networks mediate the link between network embeddedness 
and value generation remains a largely unexplored area of research. Anand and 
Khanna (2000) suggested that firms with greater experience with alliances may 
have enhanced capabilities in generating value from such relationships. Kogut 
(2000) argued that the capabilities of firms embedded in market networks are 
dependent on the principles by which cooperation among firms is coordinated 
and supported by the network. Thus, market networks are an integral part of the 
firm’s value output, i.e. output is a function of resource inputs, such as capital 
and labour, as well as value accrued from membership in market networks. 
Researchers are now beginning to address the issue of how membership in 
market networks forms part of the value of knowledge-intensive businesses 
(Karamanos 2002; Choi and Karamanos 2002).  
 
I argue that market networks are organic components of the value created 
through inter-organisational knowledge exchanges, and that networks are in a 
position to affect the imputation of value of knowledge exchanges for selected 
firms. Diffusion mechanisms within networks enable the latter to selectively 
impute and know the value of inter-organisational knowledge exchanges. The 
purpose of this paper is to address the following research questions: 
 
1.  What are the diffusion mechanisms within market networks that drive the 
selective imputation of value of inter-organisational knowledge exchanges? 
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2.  How do the characteristics of a firm’s structural embeddedness in market 
networks affect the selective imputation value of inter-organisational 
knowledge exchanges? 
 
3.  What is the extent to which networks selectively affect the diffusion of 
knowing the value of inter-firm knowledge exchanges, and how can it be 
empirically measured? 
 
The empirical locale for this paper is the high-technology industry of 
biotechnology and I study the effects of the strategic alliance market network on 
the creation of value. From literature on diffusion we distinguish two strands of 
theories that are necessary to modelling how the diffusion of knowing exchange 
value through market networks works, namely diffusion of learning and 
diffusion of fads. Sections 2 and 3 develop the theoretical framework of how 
each of these mechanisms affects the imputation of value of inter-organisational 
knowledge exchanges. In sections 4, 5 and 6, I describe the empirical analysis 
for testing the hypotheses, results are presented and conclusions drawn.  
 
 
2. Imputation of exchange value as a learning process  
 
In this section I examine how market networks act as institutions that facilitate 
the diffusion of knowing exchange value as a learning process. Scott (1995) 
emphasised that “institutions are multifaceted systems incorporating symbolic 
systems   cognitive constructions and normative rules  and regulative 
processes carried out through and shaping social behavior”. In developing the 
learning component of the model, the normative and cognitive aspects of 
networks as institutions are considered.  
 
Normative aspect of the learning process: A strand of social network theory 
research has shown that networks of clients, collaborators, suppliers, as well as 
social relations through working together and being educated together enhance 
common experiences and help partners gain greater awareness of each other’s 
fundamental value systems and norms (Noreen 1988, Huber 1991). Shared 
values and norms nurture the expectation that parties will proactively and 
voluntarily provide timely and rich information necessary for a successful 
relationship (Heide and John 1992; Inkpen and Birkenshaw 1994). For example, 
norms such as willingness to value and respond to diversity, openness to 
criticism and tolerance of failure have been shown to contribute to knowledge 
creation (Leonard-Barton 1995).  
 
Another strand of social network theory research studies how ties to networks 
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affect a firm’s trustworthiness (Coleman 1990). Trust is defined as anticipated 
cooperation (Burt and Knez 1995, p257) and incorporates the notion of partner 
credibility, which facilitates the transfer of knowledge. For instance, Szulanski 
(2000) found that credibility was negatively correlated to the difficulty of 
initiating transfers of best practice within organisations. Trust also becomes the 
principal mechanism through which the productive potential of collaborative 
resources is realised (North and Thomas 1975). This is so because it stimulates 
the perception of new combinations (Moran and Ghoshal 1999) and co-
ordinates collaboration (Dabholkar et al 1994). Trust increases the learning 
scope of knowledge exchanges because it encourages open communication and 
rapid information exchange (Powell 1990), which subsequently promote the 
development of exchange norms. In turn, norms facilitate the creation and 
exchange of resources “that are crucial for high performance but are difficult to 
value and transfer via market ties” (Uzzi 1996, p678). In summary, knowledge 
exchanges can be better co-ordinated and valued through trust, and trusted firms 
have normative proximity with the networks they are embedded in, which 
increases the learning potential between organisations and the network.  
 
The cognitive aspect of the learning bandwagon: At the individual level 
“cognition is almost always collaborative” (Levine et al 1993, p599), meaning 
that “when a group of individuals is brought together, each with their own 
knowledge structure about a particular information environment, some kind of 
emergent collective knowledge structure is likely to exist.” (Walsh 1995, p291). 
At the inter-organisational level, the emergent collective knowledge structure or 
cognitive proximity has been dubbed strategic frame (Huff 1982), industry 
recipe (Spender 1989, p69), taxonomic mental model (Porac and Thomas 1990), 
or macro-culture (Abrahamson and Fombrun 1994, p730).  
 
The institutionalisation of cognitive frameworks in the sense of shared mind-
sets provides the necessary context for rich knowledge exchanges (Boisot 
1995). Frequent social and professional interactions, dependence on supplier 
networks and recruitment from a common network of professionals lead to a 
high level of information exchange and shared mind-sets (Reger and Huff 
1993). In the same vein, Krackhardt and Stern (1988) argued that a firm’s 
network of friendship ties enhances co-operation because the face-to-face 
interaction that underlies these forms of information exchange is superior for 
interpreting social cues, capturing psycho-emotional reactions and resolving 
ambiguous issues. Similarly in the context of multi-unit organisations, it has 
been suggested that cognitive proximity implies that organisational units have 
prior tacit understanding that allows the effective utilisation of new knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Moreover it has been argued that knowledge from 
previously unrelated actors “will be difficult to acquire and may, in fact, have 
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limited value because of a lack of common language for understanding the 
knowledge” (Inkpen 1998, p76). Hence, following Friedkin (1984) who argued 
that ties between actors in a network constitute conduits through which beliefs 
are shared, we can posit that a focal firm’s embeddedness in networks increases 
its cognitive proximity to the latter, and provides a common language, both of 
which facilitate knowledge exchanges and knowing value.  
 
In summary, co-ordination for successful knowledge exchanges materialises 
through normative and cognitive proximity between partners, both of which are 
shaped by the embeddedness of partners in market networks. The more 
embedded is a firm in networks the greater the learning potential between the 
firm and the network, and the closer the networks are to knowing the focal 
firm’s knowledge capital, which facilitates the imputation of its value. Thus,   
 
Proposition 1a: For all knowledge exchanges, the imputation of value 
as a learning process increases with the focal firm’s embeddedness in 
market networks. 
    
In order to develop a hypothesis out of the above proposition we need to define 
the notion of inter-organisational knowledge exchange value. Studies of inter-
organisational collaborations (Chan et al 1997; Park and Kim 1997) have 
defined the value of knowledge exchanges as the assessment of their 
effectiveness, which is determined “by ex ante valuations of the[ir] long-term 
potential … as reflected in the stock market” (Park and Kim 1997, p85). The 
latter is a valid method because the general consensus in the literature is that (a) 
investors have an incentive to gather information regarding a firm’s activities 
and (b) the firm’s stock price reflects the market judgement of the likely payoffs 
from those activities  even though these may be occurring in the long-term 
(Allen 1993). Fama (1991) has shown that market reaction to a firm’s 
announcements is semi-strong informationally efficient, but not fundamentally 
efficient  the latter meaning that prices are based on rational assessments of 
expected discounted present value. Thus, the direction of the market reaction is 
an unbiased indicator of the future impact of a particular knowledge exchange 
deal to the firm’s future performance. Indeed, studies have repeatedly shown 
that the direction of immediate market reaction to collaboration deals is 
consistently positive (Chan et al 1997; Park and Kim 1997; Koh and 
Venkalraman 1991).  
 
The fact that the stock market is semi-strong, informationally efficient means 
that the extent of the market reaction to a particular knowledge exchange deal 
cannot be considered as an absolutely rational assessment of their contribution 
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to future firm performance. This, together with the fact that the direction of 
market reaction to knowledge exchange deals is consistently positive, leads to 
the conclusion that there is an element of a speculative bubble effect on the 
market reaction to a firm’s announcements of knowledge exchange agreements. 
Thus, if increasing embeddedness in market networks enhances knowing 
exchange value, we expect the positive market reaction to be less for a highly 
embedded firm, because knowledge regarding the value of the exchange has 
already been incorporated into the firm’s stock price before the announcement. 
If AR1 and AR2 are the wealth gains form knowledge exchange deal 
announcements for heavily embedded and lightly embedded firms respectively, 
then we expect AR1<AR2 (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Market Reaction to Knowledge Exchange Announcements as a 


























Embeddedness in networks has been traditionally linked in the literature with 
the notion of centrality (Bonacich 1987), where a central network actor is 
defined as having extensive ties with other actors in a network, which, in turn, 
are each linked to many other actors. We can thus develop Proposition 1a into 
Hypothesis 1a as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: For all knowledge exchanges, the higher the focal 
firm’s centrality in market networks the less the positive market 
reaction to its knowledge exchange agreements. 
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Moreover, knowledge has been classified in terms of its explicitness and 
tacitness (Polanyi 1966). Explicit knowledge has low imputation costs because 
it is searchable, identifiable, accessible, transferable, reproducible and storable 
(Cowan and Foray 1997). The efficiency of explicit knowledge exchanges is not 
expected to develop with time and their value is clear to the exchange partners. 
However, knowledge can remain tacit, which is more difficult to formalise, 
impart or exchange because it resides in peoples’ beliefs, values, organisational 
routines and institutions (Inkpen 1998). In this case the efficiency of knowledge 
exchanges depends on the level of co-ordination between the exchange partners, 
and, as argued earlier, co-ordination itself is dependent on the firm’s 
embeddedness in market networks. Consequently, tacit knowledge exchanges 
become inefficient compared to the benchmark market exchange and 
fundamental exchange value assessment problems arise (Chi 1994). Hence,  
 
Proposition 1b: For exchanges of explicit knowledge the imputation 
of value as a learning process effect is small compared to that for 




Hypothesis 1b: The inverse relationship between a firm’s centrality in 
market networks and the positive market reaction to its knowledge 
exchange agreements is weaker for explicit knowledge exchanges 
than for tacit knowledge exchanges. 
 
 
3. Imputation of exchange value as a fad process  
 
Due to the inherent uncertainty of complex environments, social behaviour and 
economic outcomes are driven less by choices and more by constitutive rules 
that cannot be reduced to a mere utility maximisation function (Vanberg 1994). 
In the same vein, categorisation theory maintains that in complex social 
environments perception can be based on a set of categories that are readily 
available and provide cognitive efficiency (Ashforth and Humphrey 1997). 
Social categories work because they invoke and activate a cognitive schema 
about category members that the observer believes is reliable and that it conveys 
valid information (Fiske et al 1987). Previous research has shown that social 
categorisation mechanisms give rise to a variety of constructs, such as 
organisational image (Dutton et al 1994), organisational reputation (Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990), and rankings through status hierarchies (D’Aveni 1996).  
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We start our analysis by suggesting that the imputation of value can be driven 
by the focal firm’s external image or reputation as conveyed by the market 
networks it is embedded into. Image and reputation emanate from the perceptual 
dimension of networks and they are defined as “an observer’s impression of the 
actor’s disposition to behave in a certain manner” (Clark and Montgomery 
1998, p65). They suffer from the principal caveat that it is possible they are 
driven by the firm’s desire to present themselves as socially acceptable, and 
they are unreliable because they are susceptible to manipulation by impression 
management strategies (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).   
 
Abandoning organisational reputation and image as a means of knowing 
exchange value, we consider status as a signal of the underlying quality of an 
actor’s products in relation to the perceived quality of that actor’s competitors’ 
products (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Podolny 1993). Podolny stressed that 
status becomes more reliable when “the loose linkage between status and 
quality is mediated by a producer’s ties to others in the market” (Podolny 1993, 
p832). The linkage between status and value is strengthened by the focal firm’s 
structure of embeddedness in networks, and, in this case, the construct of status 
can determine expectations of future conduct (Berger et al 1980). 
 
It is important however to clarify which dimension of the market networks 
drives the linkage between status and value. Sometimes status is treated as 
emanating from the perceptual dimension of networks. For instance, status has 
been operationalised as the evaluation of “the admiration for the quality of [an 
academic] faculty”, or as academics’ “impressions about the quality of faculty 
at each school”, or “the national business community’s impressions”, or 
“reputations among top executives” (D’Aveni 1996, p186). In these cases it is 
assumed that status rests upon some notion of perceived value “as judged by 
those capable of evaluating the product” (Perrow 1961, p336 cited in D’Aveni 
(1996)). But what about the situation where there are no knowledgeable 
informants because it is impossible to objectively evaluate a product ex ante or 
when knowledgeable informants do not reach a consensus in their valuation? To 
overcome this limitation we propose that the imputation of value is based on a 
positional construction of the focal firm’s status. This is a ranking system based 
on positional rather than reputational network data  which are data “from 
among the occupants of particular, formally defined positions or group 
memberships” (Scott J., p58). The efficacy of such a ranking system stems from 
a firm’s inability to manipulate its position in network because the latter is 
derived solely from the firm’s network ties, i.e. activities, events and relations in 
which it is actually involved. Thus, 
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Proposition 2: For all knowledge exchanges, the imputation of 
exchange value as a fad process operates via a positional ranking 
mechanism reflecting the focal firm’s structure of embeddedness in 
networks of true relationships with partners. 
 
A network assigns the focal firm to a social category according the structure of 
the focal firm’s embeddedness. Network parameters are the means of 
deciphering and quantifying the structure of the focal firm’s embeddedness in 
the network and, subsequently, the means of assigning it to a social category. 
Social categories are bound together by the principle of homophily, i.e. the 
cohesive effect of similarity. Homophily refers to a perception of oneness with 
others, belonging to a social category (Ashforth and Mael 1989, p21), as well as 
the tendency for social actors to interact with similar others (Blau 1977). Thus, 
 
Proposition 3: Market networks assign firms to social categories 
according to network parameters defined by the firms’ structure of 
embeddedness in these network. Members of the same social category 
are bound together by homophily. 
 
For instance, biotechnology firms are typically embedded in the network of life 
science research scientists, and they are assigned to social categories according 
to their structure of embeddedness in this network. For example, a focal firm 
may be assigned to the social category of biotechnology-firms-with-ties-to-star-
scientists  scientists who make “numerous commercially valuable discoveries” 
(Liebeskind  et al 1996, p430). Most of these stars work in universities and 
research institutions, and they are not willing to abandon their university 
appointments and laboratory teams for the sake of commercial biotechnology 
(Zucker et al 1998). Focal firms that are members of the biotechnology-firms-
with-ties-to-star-scientists social category are bound together by homophily, 
defined by the network parameter ties to star scientists in the life science 
research network.  
 
Social categories to which firms are assigned are not equally salient. For 
instance, in the biotechnology industry, the biotechnology-firms-with-ties-to-
star-scientists social category is much more salient than the biotechnology-
firms-with-no-ties-to-star-scientists category, and it is the salience of star 
scientists amongst the life science research network that assigns high salience to 
the biotechnology-firms-with-ties-to-star-scientists category. Thus, if a firm is 
linked with highly salient network partners then it is assigned to a highly salient 
social category by that network.  
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Following Knoke and Burt’s (1983) definition of prominent network actors, a 
firm’s network partners are salient within a network to the extent that they are 
visible to other actors in the network because of their extensive ties within the 
network. For instance, in the biotechnology community, salient venture capital 
firms will be those most frequently involved in the supply of venture capital to 
biotechnology firms. Thus, salience in networks is measured as a centrality 
concept that captures the extent of ties of a focal actor to the rest of the network 
(Bonacich 1987). In summary, a salient social category in a network is defined 
by central network actors and the focal firm is assigned to it if it is linked to 
these actors.  
 
When a focal firm has ties to a central actor, the latter plays the role of a third-
party referent for subsequent exchanges the focal firm will have with the 
network, because the focal firm finds itself increasingly indirectly connected to 
the network through the central actor’s other ties. For example, Timmons and 
Bygrave (1986) found that for new ventures the amount of finance venture 
capitalists provide, and the price at which they provide it, is important. 
However, “who the venture capitalists are” is as important because venture 
capitalists’ specialised know-how includes their “web of contacts and networks” 
(162).  In which case Burt and Knez (1995) argued that the indirect connections 
would make the focal firm more salient because they would convey information 
relating to the focal firm. This flow of information would make the network 
more certain of their imputation of the focal firm value. Depending on the frame 
through which the network sees the focal firm  positive or negative  it will be 
seen as trustworthy or not (Burt and Knez 1995, p261) and, accordingly, the 
imputation of exchange value produced by the indirect ties of the focal firm 
through a salient network partner will be positive or negative. 
 
Moreover, ties with central network actors will not only increase the flow of 
information through indirect ties to the network, but the network partner’s 
salience in itself increases the credibility of the stories conveyed by the indirect 
ties. This is so because central network actors are considered powerful in that 
their perception of the network matches the actual network – they know the 
network – and actors who have knowledge of networks are considered 
trustworthy (Granovetter 1992) and more influential (Krackhardt 1990). Trusted 
network actors are also credible because credibility is largely determined by 
trustworthiness (Perloff 1993). Cental network actors generate credible 
information about the focal firm, as, for instance, in the case of a well-regarded 
pharmaceutical firm performing due diligence before entering into a 
collaboration agreement with a biotechnology start-up firm. Because of the 
increased credibility of the information conveyed by the indirect ties through 
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central network actors there is status transfer from the central actor to the focal 
firm, which is capable of starting fads regarding the focal firm’s value. 
Depending on the frame through which the network sees the focal firm  
positive or negative  the focal firm’s ties with central network actors will have 
a positive or negative effect on knowing exchange value. In summary, central 
network actors hold power in that they act as social referents who affect the 
imputation of exchange value within market networks. Thus,  
 
Proposition 4: Firms are assigned to social categories of high value 
salience if they are linked to central market network partners. The 
higher the salience of a focal firm’s social category the stronger the 
network effects on the imputation of value of its exchanges. 
 
It was argued earlier that the short-term market reaction to knowledge exchange 
agreements is positive and that this positive reaction is partially a speculative 
bubble. Hence Proposition 4 becomes Hypothesis 2, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: For all knowledge exchange, depending on the frame 
through which a market network sees a firm, the higher the centrality 
of the firm’s exchange partners the stronger the positive or negative 





4. Data and methods 
 
4.1 Dependent variable and regression model 
 
The hypotheses developed in the previous two sections were tested in the 
context of the strategic alliance network of UK dedicated biotechnology firms 
(DBFs). We used regression analysis to measure the impact of the structural 
positions of DBFs in the strategic alliance network on the value of their stock 
when a new alliance is announced. The dependent variable was the impact of an 
alliance announcement (event) on day t on the value of firm i, measured by the 
abnormal stock market return (ARit) surrounding the event. Ex post performance 
of an alliance will not be perfectly predicted by this ex ante estimate. Instead, 
abnormal returns reflect the expected value that the market believes the firm 
will capture by entering into a particular alliance.  
 
ARs were calculated from raw return (Rit) data. Rit is calculated from the 
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observed share price and dividend behaviour of the DBFs examined.  The raw 














where Pit is the stock price for firm i on day t and Dit is the dividend (if any). 
We used daily data on the stock price of each DBF to calculate Rit for a 300-day 
estimation period prior an event as well as for the event day(s). Abnormal stock 
returns were based on the Market Adjusted Model residual, with the FTSE All 
Share Index used as benchmark. This is a suitable index as it is not overly 
dependent on stock price movements in the biotechnology sector of the London 
Stock Exchange. Hence, abnormal stock return for each event was calculated as 
the difference between the firm’s raw return (Rit) and the market return that day 
(Rmt): 
ARit = Rit
 – Rmt 
 
I identified a pool of over 400 alliances of different types announced by UK 
biopharmaceuticals and diagnostics DBFs from 1992 to 1999. Data were 
collected from Wire News databases, company announcements, the 
Recombinant Capital database (www.recap.com), and DBFs websites. From the 
initial pool, I excluded (a) deals announced before the corresponding DBFs 
began listing their stock, (b) deals for which the exact date of announcement is 
not verifiable or known precisely, and (c) extensions of existing deals because it 
was assumed that the market had incorporated that information at the time of 
the original announcement. After these exclusions 209 alliances were retained 
which were formed in period 1994-2000. Abnormal returns for these knowledge 
exchange deal announcements formed the sample data points for the 
regressions. 
 
Alliances activity in the UK biotechnology sector intensified in 1997-2000, with 
the largest number of agreements in one year being 54 in 1998 (Table 1). I 
identified four alliances types, which involve different types of knowledge 
exchanges between partners, as shown in Table 1: (a) Research or Development 
(some including licensing options), (b) Licensing or Technology Transfer, (c) 
Marketing and/or Distribution (some include licensing), and (d) Combined 
Development, Licensing and Marketing/Distribution. Of the 209 data points, 
54% of the announcements involved research or development agreements, 20% 
licensing or technology transfer agreements, 9.5% marketing or distribution 
agreements and 16% complicated agreements that combined development, 
licensing and marketing. We can see that research or development alliances are 
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dominant over marketing because most relations start as research or 
development agreements with licensing and marketing options should the 
projects come to fruition, and also because, up to recently UK 
biopharmaceutical DBFs have only managed to bring a very small number of 
final products to the market. 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Strategic Alliances by Year and Type 
Alliance  Type  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Research  or  Development  1 1 0 5 4 9 
Licensing  or  Technology  Transfer  0 0 0 4 5 5 
Marketing  or  Distribution  0 0 0 0 0 5 
Development,  Licensing  and  Marketing  0 1 0 1 3 6 
Yearly Total  1 2 0  10  12  25 
Cumulative Total  1 3 3  13  25  50 
Yearly Total as Percent of Cumulative Total  0.48 0.96 0.96  4.8  5.7  12.0 
 
 1997  1998  1999  9/2000  Total 
Research or Development  21  32  25  15  113 
Licensing or Technology Transfer  7  11  3  7  42 
Marketing or Distribution  1  7  5  2  20 
Development, Licensing and Marketing  8  4  6  5  34 
Total  37 54 40 29  209 
Cumulative Yearly Total  87 141  180  209  - 
Yearly Total as Percent of Cumulative Total  17.7 25.8 19.1 13.9  100% 
 
Although Research or Development deals may include some commercialisation 
clauses, neither licenses nor commercialisation are the main focus of such 
agreements. Combined Development, Licensing and Marketing/Distribution 
agreements materialise at a much later stage of product development than 
Research or Technology agreements and include detailed licensing and 
commercialisation clauses. Thus, the nature of knowledge exchanges in 
combined Development, Licensing and Marketing/Distribution agreements, and 
Research or Development agreements, is different. In the former it is more 
explicit technological know-how that is exchanged and developed with a clear 
objective of immediate commercialisation, whereas in the latter knowledge is 
more tacit as the technology is still in a very early stage of development. 
 
We used a cross-sectional regression model to test the hypotheses. The model is 
described by the following equation:  
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i mi mi i x CAR        0
where   is the m mi x th predictor variable for the data point i and   is the error term 





4.2 Independent variables - Mapping the UK biotechnology alliances market 
network 
 
Alliances in the biotechnology industry have been very popular, with over 7,000 
alliances formed by US biotechnology companies in 1976-2001, and 1,142 
alliances by European biotechnology companies in 1995-2001 (Ernst & Young 
2001). The popularity of alliances in the biotechnology industry means that 
there exist dense market networks in the US and Europe.  
 
Market network data for this study came from strategic alliances and joint 
ventures by UK public DBFs in the biopharmaceuticals and diagnostics sectors 
between 1986 and 1999. The UK public biotechnology industry is the dominant 
force in Europe and accounts for 41% of the European industry in terms of 
number of firms (Ernst & Young 2001). The biopharmaceuticals and 
diagnostics sectors dominate the UK biotechnology industry and account for 
88% of the industry in terms of assets and 58% in terms of number of 
companies (Arthur Andersen 1997). 
 
The number of reported alliances from 1983 to 1999 increased every year and 
totals to 575 (Figure 2), with R&D, Licensing, Marketing and Distribution deals 
being the most prolific (Table 2). Data were collected from Wire News 
databases, company announcements, the Recombinant Capital database 
(www.recap.com), and DBFs’ websites. Each type of alliance requires varying 
levels of organisational commitment and leads to differing levels of 
organisational interdependence and knowledge transfer. To reflect these 
differences alliances were weighted according to the intensity of the relationship 
between the partners, as shown in Table 2 and in accordance with previous 
alliance research (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). As shown in Table 3, alliances 
partners included (a) diversified firms (pharmaceuticals, chemicals), (b) other 
DBFs, (c) suppliers, and (d) research institutes, with the majority of partners 
being diversified firms (55%) and other DBFs (34%). In terms of the 
geographical distribution of the partners we found that the majority of alliances 
(44%) were with US firms (Figure 3). 
 










































































































Table 2. Alliance Types, Frequencies and Weights 
 
Agreement Type  Frequency  Weight 
Joint Venture  18 9






Asset or Technology purchase 14 2
Option 2  1 
TOTAL 575   
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Table 3. Distribution of Alliances by Partner Type 
 
  Partner Type  Number of deals 
Diversified firms     
Pharmaceutical 293   
Chemical 15   
Food 7   
   315  (55%) 
Other DBFs    
Therapeutics 12   
Diagnostics 23   
Services and Suppliers  37   
Agricultural or Veterinary  6   
   195  (34%) 
Suppliers   28  (5%) 
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b assessed the effect of the focal firm’s (DBF) centrality in 
the strategic alliance market network on the abnormal returns from its 
knowledge-intensive collaborations. Alliance data were organised in DBF-by-
partner data matrices for each year in the period 1992-1999 and a DBF-by-DBF 
adjacency matrix was calculated for each year of observation, using UCINET V 
software. The DBF-by-DBF matrix for each year was used to calculate the DBF 
centrality for each year in the period 1992-1999. For each knowledge exchange 
deal in the sample I used the DBF centrality for the previous year as the 
independent variable for testing Hypotheses 1. Therefore, focal firm centrality 
refers to the centrality of the DBF in the network the calendar year before the 
deal announcement was made, which captures the knowing exchange value as 
learning process in a window of minimum one year and maximum two years 
depending on whether the deal was announced at the beginning or the end of the 
calendar year. This is an appropriate time window given that the average age for 
strategic alliances to start creating value is about two years. All centrality scores 
were normalised relative to the maximum possible in the network for each year.  
 
Centrality can be measured in several ways, each of which is associated with 
different interpretation (Freeman 1979; Faust 1997)
1. When measuring 
prominence, salience or involvement in a network, DEGREE_C centrality is 
used, which is defined as the number of ties an actor has in the network, 
normalised by the maximum number of ties that an actor can have in that 
network. I also used CLIQUE_C centrality, which I defined as the number of 
cliques in the network that an actor belongs to. A clique is a sub-set of a 
network in which the actors are more closely and intensely tied to one another 
than they are to other members of the network. In this analysis, a clique was 
defined as three or more actors who have all possible ties present among 
themselves. We expect that different knowledge circulate in each clique since 
the former cannot circulate from one clique to another as freely as between 
clique members.  
 
Hypothesis 2 assessed the effect of the focal firm’s partners’ centrality in the 
                                                 
1 Betweenness centrality is not appropriate for this analysis because it measures an actor’s power in the network 
rather that prominence or salience. Also, in theory, closeness centrality could have been tested but, technically, 
it cannot be computed for fragmented networks such as those in my sample, as there are infinite distances 
between actors. Closeness centrality defines an actor’s ability to access independently all other members of the 
network and reflects freedom from the control of others. Freeman (1979: 225) associated closeness centrality 
with efficient communication, stating that closeness “means fewer message transmissions, shorter lines and 
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alliances network on the abnormal returns to the focal firm’s knowledge-
intensive collaborations. A different approach was taken for calculating the 
centrality of the alliance partner because the hypothesised effect is reputational 
and therefore the time window needs to extend much more than two years. A 
partner-by-partner adjacency matrix was used to calculate partner centralities 
for each year of observation, but the matrix for each year accumulated all the 
alliance activity amongst industry participants until each particular year. This, I 
made the reasonable assumption that the fad effect is cumulative over time. 
Two alternative measures of partner centrality were tested, namely PARTNER 
DEGREE_C and PARTNER CLIQUE_C centrality. In order to allow for 
network effects to show an impact all centrality measures were lagged by one 
year relatively to the dependent variable. When DBFs partners’ centrality scores 
were calculated we found that we had scores for 87 events to test hypotheses 2. 
This is so because the partner centrality measures were lagged behind the 
dependent variable by one year and for many events there was no previous 
involvement of the particular partner in the network.  
 
 
4.3 Control variables 
 
A number of variables known or expected to affect the dependent variable were 
included as controls. First, I controlled for the size of DBFs, which is typically 
treated as an exogenous variable that is indicative of the extent to which a firm 
has economies of scale and scope, as well as its relative endowment with 
resources (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). Findings on the effects of size on 
firm behaviour have been highly ambiguous, so much so that Kimberly (1976) 
made the argument that in many instances firm size may be capturing the 
residual effects of factors that were omitted from the statistical models used. 
Chan et al (1997) and Das et al (1998) examined the effects of firm size on 
abnormal returns for strategic alliances and found that it is inversely related to 
abnormal returns. This is so because small firms are typically involved in the 
upstream activities of the value chain, such as research and development, and 
knowledge transfer to larger firms. Doz (1988) argued that the transfer of 
technology is competitive in that the small firms attempt to minimise the 
exposure of their know-how and exercise bargaining power when collaborating 
with large firms. Thus, it was found that market reaction to smaller firms’ 
collaborations is greater than the reaction to larger firms’ collaborations.  
 
Moreover, I was concerned with the effect firm size may have on the 
relationship between a focal firm’s centrality measure and abnormal returns. 
Benjamin and Podolny (1999) found a negative relation between firm size and a 
network measure called status. Although status is not the same measure as 
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centrality it is nevertheless a network variable related to the idea of centrality in 
a network of relations. Size has been used before as a control variable to reflect 
a firm’s resource base, it can be critical to its decision to collaborate (Gulati 
1995), and, ultimately, it may be related to a firm’s centrality in the industry-
wide network of collaborative agreements. I controlled for firm size using 
firms’ total assets or the logarithm of total assets lagged by one year relative to 
the dependent variable, and I found similar results for the two measures for firm 
size. Here I report models that use the logarithm of total assets as a measure for 
control variable SIZE.  
 
I was also concerned with the effect a DBF’s alliance experience could have on 
abnormal returns. Anand and Khanna (2000) suggested that firms with greater 
experience with alliances may have enhanced capabilities in generating value 
from such relationships. It was also reasonable to assume that alliance 
experience could be highly correlated to centrality, which could introduce 
multicollinearity. However DBF centrality and alliance experience are 
calculated over different time frames so we expect such effects to be weak. I 
therefore introduced the control variable ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE that 
counts the total cumulative number of a DBF’s collaborative deals up to each 
year of the analysis. This variable was lagged by one year relative to the 
dependent variable. 
 
Another control variable in the analysis assessed whether a collaborative 
agreement was international in its membership. Previous studies have suggested 
that domestic ventures are more likely to succeed because (a) there is better 
information available about the partners, and (b) the reputational consequence 
of opportunistic behaviour is bigger in a domestic context (Gulati 1995). Also 
Parkhe (1993) has shown that national culture affects managerial behaviour and 
moderates the relation between structural variables and performance of 
collaborations. The cultural similarity among domestic partners enhances 
mutual understanding, allowing easier co-ordination and better conflict 
resolution among the partners. I introduced the dummy variable SAME 
NATIONALITY that takes the value of 1 when an alliance comprises of 
domestic partners, and 0 when it includes international collaboration.  
 
Moreover, I expect different market reactions to different types of alliance, i.e. 
(a) R&D, (b) Licensing or Technology Transfer, (c) Marketing and/or 
Distribution, and (d) Combined Development, Licensing and 
Marketing/Distribution. This is so because each type of alliance entails varying 
levels of organisational commitment, leads to differing levels of organisational 
interdependence and risk. I used the control variable AGREEMENT TYPE to 
control for these differences. It takes the value of 1 for R&D, 2 for licensing, 3 
  18 
for marketing and 4 for combined development, licensing and marketing deals. 
Also, the dummy variable HORIZONTAL was included in the analysis, which 
takes the value of 1 when the data point involves a horizontal collaboration (i.e. 
partners come from the same industry sector and thus are similar businesses) 
and 0 when partners are dissimilar business. Prior research has shown that 
investors’ reactions to joint ventures announcements were greater when 
collaboration partners were dissimilar businesses (Balakrishnan and Koza 
1993).  
 
Finally, I included a dummy variable for each year in the analysis (called 
TIME1 to TIME6) in order to capture effects that may arise from temporal 
market trends. In a limited way these dummy variables test the claim that 
markets can be more or less optimistic at times, thus affecting abnormal returns 
in a temporal fashion. They also capture the net effect of the various temporal 
macro-economic, sector-specific factors that may be influencing market returns 
in the UK biopharmaceuticals sector. The variables used in the different 
regressions and their predicted signs are summarised in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Regression Variables and Predicted Signs of Relationships 
 
Independent variables  Definition  Predicted sign 
DEGREE_C  The number of ties a DBF has in the network each year 
of the analysis 
- 
CLIQUE_C  The number of cliques in the network that a DBF 
belongs to each year of the analysis 
- 
PARTNER DEGREE_C  The cumulative number of ties a partner has in the 
network over the years of the analysis 
+ 
PARTNER CLIQUE_C  The cumulative number of cliques a partner belongs to 





Control variables  Definition  Predicted sign 
TIME1 to TIME6  Calendar time  No prediction 
SAME NATIONALITY  1 if both partners are domestic; 0 otherwise  + 
HORIZONTAL  1 if partners are similar; 0 otherwise  - 
ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE  Number of previous alliances entered by the DBF until 
the year before the year of the announcement 
+ 
SIZE  Log of last known DBF total assets before event date  - 
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5. Abnormal returns and regression analysis results  
 
First I calculated the abnormal returns (ARs) for the 209 alliances 
announcements in the sample. Excluding contemporaneous announcement of 
alliances, which can render results unreliable, I found that the average AR for 
the day of the announcement was 4.3% and 6.1% for days “-1 to +1”; both these 
results are statistically significant (see Table 5). These results confirm earlier 
results by Das et al (1998), Chan et al (1997) and Koh and Venkataraman 
(1991). I also found that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Research or 
Development events, Licensing or Technology Transfer events and 
Development, Licensing and Marketing events together (collectively described 
in Table 5 as Technological) were positive and statistically significant. On the 
other hand, CARs for Marketing or Distribution events (collectively described 
in Table 5 as Marketing) were positive for event windows “0” and “-1 to +1”, 
and became negative when event window widened, but in all cases they were 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Research or Development CARs were 
close to CAR values for all events, Licensing or Technology Transfer CARs 
were higher than CARs for all events, and Development, Licensing, and 
Marketing CARs were on average double the CAR values for all events. This 
result provides support to the argument that abnormal returns are higher for 
events that involve products at a later stage of development than pure research 
or products in early development. In other words, the higher uncertainty 
associated with tacit knowledge exchange deals curtails market reaction 
compared to more explicit knowledge exchange deals.  
 
 
Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Different Event Windows 
 
  All Alliances  Technological  Marketing  t-statistic
2 
No. of data points =  174 129 13   
      
AR Day "0"  0.043 (14.42)
* 0.037  (10.50)
* 0.018  (1.66)
++ 1.31  [0.200] 
CAR Days "-1 to +1"  0.061 (11.96)
* 0.057  (9.34)
*  0.009 (0.45)  2.14 [0.042]
+ 
CAR Days "-2 to +2"  0.071 (10.80)
* 0.072  (9.15)
* -0.012  (-0.48)  3.04  [0.005]
+ 
      
Notes:
   
(1) Numbers in parentheses in column cells represent associated t-statistics assuming cross-sectional dependence for 
a test of the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional mean is zero. 
(2) The reported t-statistic is test value for a difference-of-means t-test. The number in square brackets represents the 
associated probability value, [P(Tt) two-tail test]. 
*p < 0.001,   
**p < 0.01,   
+p < 0.05,   
++p < 0.1 
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Figure 4. The Average Impact Over Time of an Alliance Announcement on DBF 















As shown in Figure 4, the average impact of an alliance announcement dies out 
one day after the announcement day, and there is some AR due to information 
leakage the day before the announcement. In order to test the robustness of the 
regressions results, I decided to separately test the AR on the day of the 
announcement (AR_0), the AR the day before the announcement (AR_-1), and 
the AR the day following the announcement (AR_+1), as the regression 
dependent variable. This way I can see whether centrality has a different effect 


































Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in 
the regression models for testing hypotheses 1. DEGREE_C and CLIQUE_C 
centralities are highly correlated between themselves because they describe 
similar quantities. This poses no problem because they are examined separately 
in the statistical analysis. ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE and SIZE are slightly 
correlated with DEGREE_C and CLIQUE_C centralities, which suggests there 
may be some multicollinearity across these variables. If they prove to be 
significant in the regression analysis we will have to examine whether their 
effects on the dependent variable are independent or whether they interfere, and 
if so we will have to determine in which way they do. I use the VIF statistic to 
determine the possible existence of multicollinearity. VIF values of less than 2 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
 
  N Mean  S.E.  of  Mean  Minimum Maximum 
AR_0  209  0.036 0.007 -0.238  0.733 
AR_-1  209  0.032 0.006 -0.180  0.560 
AR_+1  209  0.029 0.006 -0.230  0.490 
Degree_C  209  4.130 0.348  0 21.875 
Clique_C  209  0.398 0.052  0  4 
Same Nationality  209  0.294 0.032  0  1 
Horizontal  209  0.289 0.032  0  1 
Alliance Experience  209  15.955 0.731  1  49 
Size  209  3.199 0.089 -0.503  5.362 
Agreement Type  209  1.891 0.080  1  4 
Time1  209  0.050 0.015  0  1 
Time2  209  0.055 0.016  0  1 
Time3  209  0.119 0.023  0  1 
Time4  209  0.184 0.027  0  1 
Time5  209  0.254 0.031  0  1 


















































































































































AR_0  1     
AR_-1  0.812 1      
AR_+1  0.806 0.771 1      
Degree_C  -0.152 -0.206 -0.139 1     
Clique_C  -0.132 -0.156 -0.100 0.838  1    
Same Nationality  0.002 -0.010 0.011 0.006  0.052 1    
Horizontal  -0.006 -0.011 -0.046 0.102  0.073 -0.145 1    
Alliance Experience -0.060 -0.080 -0.043 0.350  0.262 -0.018 0.089 1    
Size  -0.100 -0.146 -0.109 0.242  0.143 -0.071 0.174 0.472 1    
Agreement Type  0.128 0.061 0.066 0.063 0.076 -0.044 -0.123 0.111 0.172 1    
Time1  -0.070 -0.085 -0.082 -0.021 -0.123 0.003 -0.045 -0.085 -0.016 -0.039 1    
Time2  0.136 0.056 0.110 0.044  -0.070 0.085 -0.057 0.016 0.099 0.081 -0.055 1   
Time3  -0.112 -0.064 -0.047 -0.127 -0.157 -0.002 -0.031 -0.182 0.014 0.158 -0.084 -0.089  1 
Time4  0.013 0.004 0.008 -0.047  -0.047 0.004 -0.048 -0.195 -0.119 0.001 -0.109 -0.114  -0.175  1
Time5  0.021 -0.044 0.003 -0.135 -0.097 -0.100 0.007 -0.014 -0.030 -0.105 -0.133 -0.140 -0.215 -0.277 1
Time6  0.052 0.068 0.061 0.182 0.195 0.043 0.048 0.201 0.134 -0.041 -0.112 -0.118  -0.181  -0.233 -0.286 1
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All regression models include the control variables AGREEMENT TYPE, 
SIZE, ALLIANCE EXPRERIENCE, HORIZONTAL, SAME NATIONALITY, 
and TIME1 to TIME6. Positive coefficients of variables indicate a direct 
relationship with abnormal returns with respect to that variable; negative 
coefficients show a inverse relationship with abnormal returns with respect to 
that variable.  
 
Hypothesis 1a was tested using the sample of 209 events with a variety of 
models to account for the different dependent variables and DBF centrality 
measures, as shown in Table 7. Models I to III test the principal dependent 
variable AR_0, models IV to VI the dependent variable AR_-1 and models VII 
to IX the dependent variable AR_+1. Models I, IV and VII are base models to 
assess effects other than those attributed to the position of the biotechnology 
firm in the alliance network. 
 
Models II and III confirm hypothesis 1a, i.e. that there is a significant inverse 
relationship between degree and cliques centralities and the abnormal return the 
day of the announcement. The less embedded the DBF has been in the network 
of strategic alliances in a period of up to two years before a new collaboration is 
announced, the higher the abnormal returns of the DBF’s shares the day of the 
announcement. Models V and VI also confirm hypothesis 1a because they show 
that there are significant network effects on the wealth gains due to information 
leakages one day before the announcement. In this case, degree and clique 
centralities are more significant (and with higher coefficients) than on the day of 
the announcement indicating that the speculation due to information leakages is 
less for higly embedded firms, or that there is less information leakages 
associated with highly embedded firms. On the other hand, models VII and IX 
show that network effects on wealth gains cease to be significant one day after 
the announcement, indicating that there are factors other than network 
embeddedness that affect wealth gains the day after the announcement.   
 
AGREEMENT TYPE is also a significant predictor of wealth gains: 
commercialisation agreements entail higher potential returns than research and 
development agreements, which indicates that the markets factor in the higher 
probability of commercialisation success associated with later stage research 
involving more explicit and easily transferable knowledge. This finding verifies 
Pisano (1989) who observed that in the biotechnology industry the degree of 
uncertainty for transaction-specific know-how is greater in collaborations that 
encompass basic R&D than in collaborations that involve the transfer, 
utilisation, or commercialisation of existing know-how. This result also 
confirms the similar result from the abnormal return analysis at the beginning of 
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section 5. 
 
We can see from Table 7 that, with very few exceptions, time is not significant, 
indicating that there is no broad temporal trend in the abnormal returns, i.e. 
market reaction has been consistent through time and that there have not been 
significant macro-economic UK biotechnology-specific industry factors 
affecting abnormal returns.  
 
 
Table 7. Regression Models Testing Hypothesis 1a 
 Model  I II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Dependent variable  AR_0 AR_-1 AR_+1 
























































































































































































































DEGREE_C  -  -0.003 
(0.023)*  - -  -0.004 
(0.003)*  - -  -0.002 
(0.052)  - 
CLIQUE _C  - -  -0.022 
(0.032)*  - -  -0.024 
(0.006)*  - -  -0.012 
(0.141) 
         
Adjusted R
2  0.028  0.049 0.046 0.007 0.049  0.041  0.005 0.10 0.002 
Number  of  data  209  209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 
“Size”  VIF  statistic  1.43  1.44 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.44 
“Alliance Experience” 
VIF statistic  1.53  1.61 1.55 1.53 1.61 1.55 1.53 1.61 1.55 
“Centrality” VIF statistic  -  1.20  1.19  -  1.20  1.19  -  1.20  1.19 
Note:  Significance level in parentheses 
*p<0.05     
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SIZE and ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE are consistently not significant predictors 
of abnormal returns, and there seems to be no multicollinearity problems with 
these variables because VIF numbers are around 1.5. SAME NATIONALITY, 
indicating alliance partners of the same nationality, is also not significant, 
indicating that the market does not perceive alliances with international partners 
as riskier due to cultural differences than domestic alliances. HORIZONTAL, 
indicating similarity between partners’ business scope, is not significant. This 
indicates that, unlike the result for joint ventures (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993), 
markets do not believe that strategic alliances are more successful when they 
involve dissimilar businesses.  
 
Splitting the data into two groups of explicit and tacit knowledge exchange 
deals respectively and running regression models for each group separately 
tested hypothesis 1b. Pure R&D collaborations (AGREEMENT TYPE = 1) 
were characterised as tacit. Licensing, marketing, or commercialisation deals 
(AGREEMENT TYPE = 2,3,4) were assigned to the explicit category. 
DEGREE_C and CLIQUE_C focal firm centrality were tested and the results 
are shown in Table 8. For tacit knowledge exchanges, DEGREE and CLIQUE 
centralities are significant and for explicit knowledge exchanges, centralities are 
insignificant, indicating no network effects. On average, VIF coefficients were 
about 1.75, which is within acceptable limits. These results support hypothesis 
1b that network effects on knowing exchange value are stronger in the case of 
tacit knowledge deals. 
 
Hypothesis 2 was tested using the sample of 87 events for which it was possible 
to calculate centrality scores for DBFs’ partners.  Abnormal returns for the day 
of the announcement (AR_0) and cumulative abnormal returns for one day 
before and one day after the announcement (CAR_-1+1) were used as 
alternative dependent variables. Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the variables in the regression models. PARTNER DEGREE_C 
and PARTNER CLIQUE_C centralities are highly correlated between 
themselves because they describe similar quantities. This poses no problem 
because they are examined separately in the statistical analysis. PARTNER 
DEGREE_C and PARTNER CLIQUE_C are slightly correlated with 
AGREEMENT TYPE and HORIZONTAL, which is expected because different 
partner types are associated with different agreement types. ALLIANCE 
EXPERIENCE and SIZE are also slightly correlated which suggests there may 
be some multicollinearity. I use the VIF statistic to determine the possible 
existence of multicollinearity. VIF values of less than 2 indicate low 
multicollinerity in which case results can be trusted.  I used TIME as a dummy 
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variable that takes a different value for each year of the analysis. The models for 
testing hypothesis 2 are shown in Table 10. 
 
 
Table 8. Regression Models Testing Hypothesis 1b 
 
 Model  I II III  IV  V VI 
Agreement Type  TACIT   EXPLICIT  




































































































































DEGREE Centrality  -  -0.004 
(0.030)* 
- -  -0.004 
(0.138) 
- 
CLIQUE Centrality  - -  -0.026 
(0.050)* 
- -  -0.022 
(0.206) 
            
Adjusted R
2 0.026  0.063  0.054  0.054  0.069  0.062 
Number of data  108  108  108  101  101  101 
“Size” VIF statistic  1.73  1.75  1.74  1.47  1.47  1.47 
“Alliance Experience” VIF 
statistic  1.74 1.76  1.74  1.68 1.96  1.83 
“Centrality” VIF statistic  -  1.30  1.26  -  1.33  1.32 
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
 
  N Mean  S.E.  of  Mean  Maximum  Minimum 
AR_0  87 0.048  0.011  0.680  -0.240 
CAR_-1+1  87        
Partner Degree_C  87 0.391  0.023  1  0.020 
Partner Clique _C  87 0.306  0.032  1  0 
Same Nationality  87 0.320  0.050  1  0 
Horizontal   87 0.150  0.038  1  0 
Alliance Experience  87 17.264  1.201  49  1 
Size  87 3.348  0.113  5.360  1.090 
Agreement Type  87 2.060  0.130  4  1 









































































































































AR_0  1            
CAR_-1+1  .833  1          
Partner Degree_C  .142  .165  1         
Partner Clique _C  .129  .148  .919  1        
Same Nationality  .021  .077  -.102  -.193  1       
Horizontal   .001  .012  -.324 -.250 -.151 1         
Alliance Experience  -.079 -.046 .043  -.011 -.076 .126  1       
Size  -.179 -.157 -.037 -.092 -.121 .149  .453  1     
Agreement Type  .222 .201 -.234  -.302  -.012  .085 .184 .194 1   




The results show that PARTNER DEGREE_C and PARTNER CLIQUE_C 
centralities are significant and both have a positive effect on abnormal returns of 
alliance announcements, which verify hypothesis 2 and indicate that in 
uncertain contexts the prominence of a focal firm’s exchange partner becomes a 
base of evaluation. Consistent with the results for hypotheses 1 SIZE, 
ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE, HORIZONTAL, SAME NATIONALITY, and 
TIME were not found to be significant, but AGREEMENT TYPE is a 
significant predictor of wealth gains. VIF statistics are well within acceptable 
limits so there is no multicollinearity and the results are robust.  
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Table 10. Regression Models Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
 
Models  I II  III  IV  V  VI 
Dependent variable  AR_0 CAR_-1+1 




















































































PARTNER DEGREE_C  -  0.111 
(0.040)*  - -  0.063 
(0.022)*  - 
PARTNER CLIQUE_ C  - -  0.008 
(0.048)*  - -  0.046 
(0.025)* 
      
Adjusted R
2  0.042 0.080 0.077 0.030 0.081 0.078 
Number of data  87  87  87  87  87  87 
“Size” VIF statistic  1.31  1.31  1.32  1.31  1.31  1.32 
“Alliance Experience” VIF 
statistic  1.32 1.35 1.33 1.32 1.35 1.33 
“Centrality” VIF statistic  -  1.25  1.27  -  1.25  1.27 
Note: Significance level in parentheses 
*p<0.05 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This study found strong evidence that the imputation by the markets of the 
value of inter-organisational knowledge exchange deals is influenced by the 
structural characteristics of firms and their partners in market networks. There 
are network resources, in the form of diffusion mechanisms within market 
networks, that drive the selective imputation of value of inter-organisational 
knowledge exchanges. I summarize the results around two sets of findings 
concerning: (a) the imputation of exchange value as learning, and (b) the 
imputation of exchange value as fad.  
 
Evidence showed that a firm’s central position in the network of strategic 
alliances negatively affected wealth gains from the announcement of knowledge 
exchange deals. More specifically, for tacit knowledge exchange deals, the 
market reacts more to announcements by firms in the periphery of the strategic 
alliance network, which suggests that the imputation of value as learning is a 
significant process in operation. On the other hand, the imputation of value of 
explicit knowledge exchange deals does not seem to be affected by the 
structural position of the DBF in the network of strategic alliances. These 
dynamics take place one day before and on the day of the deal announcement, 
but die out one day after the announcement. 
 
Moreover, the position of a DBF’s partner in the network of strategic alliances 
is also a significant predictor of wealth gains from the announcement of 
knowledge exchange deals. The more central a firm’s partner the higher the 
wealth gains, which suggests that the imputation of value as fad is a significant 
process in operation. This result is consistent with the argument in strategic 
alliance literature that a firm’s important constituents view the gaining of a 
prestigious alliance partner as an endorsement of quality (Stuart et al 1999) and 
as a signal that conveys social status and recognition (Stuart 2000). This study 
has offered additional evidence to confirm that alliances with prominent 
partners offer endorsement benefits that are immediately and easily obtained, as 
indicated by superior wealth gains, even when eventually they fail to achieve 
the strategic objectives that led to their formation.    
 
The results of this paper also show that alliances create value, which confirms 
Das et al (1998), Chan et al (1997) and Koh and Venkataraman (1991). CARs 
for Research or Development events, Licensing or Technology Transfer events 
and Development, Licensing and Marketing events together were positive and 
statistically significant. On the other hand, CARs for Marketing or Distribution 
events were positive for event windows “0” and “-1 to +1”, and became 
negative when the event window widened, but in all cases they were statistically 
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indistinguishable from zero. Research or Development CARs were close to 
CAR values for all events, Licensing or Technology Transfer CARs were higher 
than CARs for all events, and Development, Licensing, and Marketing CARs 
were on average double the CAR values for all events. This result provides 
support to the argument that abnormal returns are higher for events that involve 
products at a later stage of development than pure research or products in early 
development. 
 
I found no evidence to suggest that firms learn to create value as they 
accumulate experience in alliances, as Anand and Khanna (2000) suggested. 
Perhaps this is so because I focused my attention exclusively to the 
biotechnology industry in the UK, and my results could not be generalised for 
another industries and countries. However I believe this is an interesting 
antithesis and more light could be shed on it if one were to repeat Anand’s and 
Khanna’s analysis with both alliance experience and centrality variables 
included. In this case, firm experience would reflect what they term “firm 
learning” and centrality would be a proxy for “market learning”. This additional 
analysis would probably clarify whether the positive effect of the number of 
alliances on the announcement wealth gains reflects market learning rather than 
firm learning.  
 
In conclusion, I would like to suggest a few avenues for future research. A 
useful extension of this study could consider the implications from a firm’s 
participation in multiple networks such as joint patents, board interlocks, bank 
ties, and professional association memberships. It would also be beneficial to 
consider the contents of those ties based upon the different kinds of information 
that flow through them. For example, centrality in other networks may be 
significant for the imputation of value of explicit knowledge exchanges only 
because the contents of different network ties is different as to the types of 
information they carry. Another avenue for research is the use of more social 
network analysis tools. Density and centralisation are two structural variables 
that can be introduced. Rowley (1997) argued that when network density 
increases the average salience of social categories defined by central actors 
decreases. Thus value salience will increase only with increasing stakeholder 
centrality and decreasing network density. Centralisation is related to density 
but also measures how cohesion (i.e. dense network areas) is organised around 
particular focal actors (Marsden 1990). Highly centralised networks are like 
hierarchies and, in the extreme, there is only one focal actor. In decentralised 
networks there are no focal actors because everyone is connected to everyone 
else. Centralisation, then, tells as how information flows through the network 
structure, because in hierarchical networks focal actors at the top will control 
the flow of information. There are, thus, implications for informational power 
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and influence inherent in the degree of network centralisation. Also, 
centralisation may give a better indication of the relative informational power of 
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